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Abstract 
 
In this paper we revisit the gender decomposition of wages in the presence 
of selection bias. We show that when labor market participation decisions of 
couples are not independent, the sample selection corrections used in the 
literature have been incomplete (incorrect). We derive the appropriate 
sample selection corrections, based on a reduced form model for the joint 
participation decisions of both spouses. The influence that husbands’ 
participation decision has on the female participation decision also highlights 
the importance of using data on both spouses for the analysis of the gender 
wage gap. Taking account of these issues might influence the outcome of 
the decomposition analysis and affect the evidence of discrimination. We 
analyze its potential impact by analyzing the gender earnings differential 
using Canadian census data. 
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature that considers household decisions as a joint decision and bargaining
process between husband and wife (Manser and Brown, 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, and
Becker, 1981). Although there is much debate as to what model describes the decision process
best, there is agreement on the fact that the spouses decisions are generally interrelated. This
is also likely to hold for labor market participation decisions. The literature on the gender wage
gap decomposition, however, has neglected this issue, treating the wifes participation decision as
independent of that of the husbands.
Since Oaxacas 1973 inuential paper, a lot of empirical research has been devoted to mea-
suring the extend of the gender earnings gap which cannot be explained by wage-related charac-
teristics, also labelled discrimination. One issue about these decompositions that has received
a lot of attention is the assumption made concerning what the level of wages would have been in
the absence of discrimination, that is, the nondiscriminatory wage structure.1 Whereas correct-
ing for the individualsparticipation decision has become standard practice in the gender wage
decomposition literature (Newman and Oaxaca, 2004), we show that when labor market partici-
pation decisions of couples are not independent, the sample selection corrections used have been
incomplete (incorrect).
This paper develops the appropriate sample selection corrections when the labor market de-
cisions of spouses are dependent. A reduced form model is used to avoid a strong dependence of
the results on a specic bargaining/decision model. The inuence that husbandsparticipation
decision has on the female participation decision also highlights the importance of using data on
both spouses for the analysis of the gender wage gap.
For the nondiscriminatory wage structure we follow Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ran-
som (1994). Empirical application of the gender gap decomposition using the Oaxaca-Ransom-
Neumark procedure in the presence of sample selectivity (e.g., Mavromaras and Rudolph, 1997)
has not accounted for the distinctive and jointly determined participation rules of men and women.
A recent discussion of the gender gap decomposition under the pooled nondiscriminatory wage
structure (in absence of selectivity corrections) can be found in Fortin (2006). She highlights
1Various suggestions have emerged: adopting either the male wage or the female wage structure as the reference
wage structure (Oaxaca (1973)); adopting a weighted average of the male and female wage structure (with the
proportion of each subgroup in the population used as weights) Cotton (1988); or adopting the pooled wage
structure (Neumark, 1988, Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994, Fortin, 2006).
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potential problems in the analysis arising from the absence of gender dummies in the pooled
regression. Not accounting for distinctive participation rules, just like ignoring a gender dummy
in the pooled regression, could lead to the pooled coe¢ cients capturing part of the between
male and female e¤ects (particularly with large gender di¤erences in explanatory variables and/or
participation rules), thereby a¤ecting the outcome of the decomposition analysis and a¤ecting the
evidence of discrimination. We illustrate our methodological contribution by analyzing the gender
earnings di¤erential using Canadian census data.
The empirical results give strong evidence of correlatedness between the selectivity errors of
men and women indicating that unobserved factors positively a¤ecting the husbandspaid em-
ployment status a¤ect his wifes paid employment status positively as well, pointing to similarity
of partnersunobserved skills. The signicant evidence of intrahousehold correlatedness of the
unobservables has important consequences concerning the explanatory variables in light of our
assumed exogenous regressors assumption. In particular, we note that the denition typically
used for unearned income in empirical work "household income minus the individuals earnings"
should be avoided due to the resulting endogeneity such a variable would induce (emanating from
spousal income). This endogeneity would yield inconsistent parameter estimates.
The empirical results moreover give evidence of a similarity of spouses unobservable pro-
ductivity enhancing skills. Moreover, strong evidence is found of correlatedness between the
unobservables in the selection and the earnings equation  both individual specic and intra-
household (between husband and wife) indicating that sample selectivity corrections are called
for. These correlations are found to be negative, indicating that unobservables in the error terms
which encourage participation in the wage sector are associated with lower earnings.
Part of the observed wage gap is a direct result of their di¤erential participation decisions 
or, the o¤ered wage gap is signicantly lower than the observed wage gap, when accounting for
selectivity corrections. Taking the distinctive and jointly determined participation rules of men
and women into account when obtaining the nondiscriminatory (pooled) wage structure reduces
the evidence of discrimination. Moreover, a larger part of the level of "discrimination" should
be attributed to a market undervaluation of women than a more favorable market evaluation of
observed characteristics for men. Adding additional controls for eld of study does not signicantly
a¤ect the decomposition analysis, but there does appear some reduction in "discrimination" (in
the narrower sense of unequal pay for equal work) when additional controls for occupation and
industry are added.
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In Section 2 the model is discussed and the gender wage decomposition is outlined. The
data are described in Section 3. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 4, and Section
5 concludes. In the appendix, we provide the derivation of the standard errors of the two-step
procedure, elaborate on the pooled earnings regression, provide a glossary of the standard errors
of the decomposition terms. Various tables are relayed to the appendix as well.
2 Wage Determination and the Gender Gap
We consider the estimation of standard human capital earnings functions for men and women in
the presence of selectivity when labor market participation decisions of couples are not indepen-
dent. As one may expect the participation and earnings equations for men and women to di¤er,
the model we consider is given by
dki = 1(x
0
kik + "ki > 0)
yki = z
0
kik + uki
yki = dkiy

ki for i = 1; :::; n:
(1)
where k = male, female and i denotes a given household. The rst equation is the participation
equation (where dki is a dummy variable indicating whether this individual is a wage worker), the
individuals latent o¤ered wage (in logarithms) is given by yki and yki represents his/her observed
wage.2 The variables inuencing the decision to participate in the labor market are xki and zki are
the variables inuencing the o¤ered wage. Both xki and zki may contain spousal characteristics.
Let xi = (xmi [ xfi) and zi = (zmi [ zfi): As in the standard selection model, Heckman (1976,
1979), we allow the error terms of the selection and outcome equations of individuals, ("ki; uki);
to exhibit correlations. In addition, dependencies between husband and wifes error terms are
allowed: conditional on (zi; xi) the errors have a multivariate normal distribution, given by26666664
umi
ufi
"mi
"fi
37777775

zi;xi
 N
0BBBBBB@0;
0BBBBBB@
2um umuf "mum "muf
umuf 
2
uf
"mum "muf
"mum "mum 1 "m"f
"muf "muf "m"f 1
1CCCCCCA
1CCCCCCA : (2)
For identication purposes, the variances of the selection errors ("mi; "fi) are standardized to
equal 1.
2An individual chooses to be in the sampleof workers (dki = 1), if his/her o¤ered wage exceeds their reservation
wage (yki   yRki = x0kik + "ki > 0) and dki = 0 otherwise.
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Models of the joint participation decision of husbands and wives that consider their respective
participation to be endogenous run into the well known di¢ culties of coherency (e.g., see Heckman
(1978) and Tamer (2003)). This type of endogeneity is not explicitly allowed, nevertheless our
model can be viewed as the reduced form of such a model.
Modeling the participation decision simultaneously, indeed, allows us to propose selectivity
corrections that take account of the joint decision process faced by men and women. The resulting
augmented two-step Heckman estimation proceeds as follows. First, a bivariate probit regression
is estimated on the participation decisions of husbands and wives in the wage sector. The log
likelihood function is given by
logL(m; f ; "m"f ;x; z)
=
NX
i=1
dmi=dfi
=1
log 2(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ; "m"f ) +
NX
i=1
dmi=1;dfi
=0
log 2(x
0
mim; x0fif ; "m"f )
+
NX
i=1
dmi=0;dfi
=1
log 2( x0mim; x0fif ; "m"f ) +
NX
i=1
dmi=0;dfi
=0
log 2( x0mim; x0fif ; "m"f );
where, 2(; ; ) denotes the standardized bivariate normal cumulative density function with
correlation :In the setting where "m"f = 0, this reduces to running separate probit regressions
for men and women. Second, sample selectivity corrected wage functions are estimated that
take into account this joint participation decision, in place of introducing gender specic sample
selectivity corrections based solely on the individualsdecision to participate or not. Specically,
the correction we propose involves the introduction of two selectivity correction terms in each wage
function. The selectivity correction terms are obtained by evaluating for the male wage function
the conditional expectations E(umijdmi = 1; dfi = 1; xi; zi) and E(umijdmi = 1; dfi = 0; xi; zi):
Each can be written as the linear combination of two selection correction terms, 1i and 2i;
specically
E(umijdmi = 1; dfi; xi; zi) =
 
um"m1(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) + um"f2(x
0
mim; x
0
fif )

dmi:
where
1(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) = qmi
(!mi)(
!fi "m"f !miq
1 2"m"f
)
2(!mi;!fi;"m"f )
and
2(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) = qfi
(!fi)(
!mi "m"f !fiq
1 2"m"f
)
2(!mi;!fi;"m"f )
:
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The following notation has been used in order to simplify the notation of these selection correction
terms:
qki = 2dki   1
!ki = qki (x
0
kik)
"m"f = qmiqfi"m"f :
The sample selectivity corrected male wage regression, can then be written as
ymidmi = (z
0
mim + um"m1(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) + um"f2(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) + mi)dmi; (3)
where vmi = umi dfiE(umijdmi = 1; dfi = 1; xi; zi)  (1 dfi)E(umijdmi = 1; dfi = 0; xi; zi); and
E(vmijdmi = 1; xi; zi) = 0 by construction. Note, in absence of any correlation between husbands
and wiveserror terms, "m"f = 0 and um"f = 0; the specication reduces to the standard wage
equation with the standard inverse Mills ratio included for the selectivity correction.
Similarly, for women, we obtain
yfidfi = (z
0
fif + uf "m1(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) + uf "f2(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) + fi)dfi: (4)
As in the standard sample selectivity corrected wage regressions, both wage equations (3) and
(4) exhibit heteroscedasticity. Moreover, they form a system of seemingly unrelated regressions,
due to the correlations between spouses, since Cov(vmi; vfijdmi=1; dfi = 1; xi; zi) 6= 0 in general.
Specically
Var(vmijdmi = 1; dfi; xi; zi) = 2um  

um"m
m
1i + um"f 
m
2i
	
Var(vfijdfi = 1; dmi; xi; zi) = 2uf  
n
uf "m
f
1i + uf "f 
f
2i
o
Cov(vmivfijdmi = 1; dfi = 1; xi; zi) = umuf  

uf "m
m
1i + uf "f 
m
2i
	
:
(5)
Here
k1 (x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) = uk"m
(
1i(1i + x
0
mim) +
"m"fq
1 2"m"f
3i
)
+ uk"f
(
1i2i   1q
1 2"m"f
3i
)
k2 (x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) = uk"f
(
2i(2i + x
0
fif ) +
"m"fq
1 2"m"f
3i
)
+ uk"m
(
1i2i   1q
1 2"m"f
3i
)
;
with 3i dened as
3(x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) = qmiqfi
(!mi)(
!fi "m"f !miq
1 2"m"f
)
2(!mi;!fi;"m"f )
:
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The conditional variance of vmi can be rewritten as,
Var(vmijdmi = 1; dfi; xi; zi)
= 2um
 
1  2um"m
(
1i(1i + x
0
mim) +
"m"fq
1 2"m"f
3i
)
  2um"f
(
2i(2i + x
0
fif ) +
"m"fq
1 2"m"f
3i
)
 2um"mum"f
(
1i2i   1q
1 2"m"f
3i
)!
: (6)
This formulation of the conditional variance facilitates our observation that without any corre-
lations between husbandsand wiveserrors, that is "m"f = 0; um"f = 0; and 1i =
(x0mim)
(x0mim)
; the
simplication to the standard formula pertains, i.e., 2um

1  2um"m
n
(x0mim)
(x0mim)
(
(x0mim)
(x0mim)
+ x0mim)
o
:
In matrix notation, our regression model is given by
D
0@ ym
yf
1A = D
240@ Wm 0
0 Wf
1A0@ m
f
1A+
0@ vm
vf
1A35 ;
whereD is a diagonal matrix with elements (dm1; :::; dmN ; df1; :::; dfN); whereN equals the number
of households, Wk = [Zkj1j2] and k =

0k; uk"m ; uk"f
0 with k = male, female. Correspond-
ingly, we express
V ar
24D
0@ vm
vf
1A jX;Z
35  V ar
240@ Dm 0
0 Df
1A0@ vm
vf
1A jX;Z
35
=
24 Dm  2umIN  m DmDf (umuf IN  mf )
DmDf (umuf IN  mf ) Df (2uf IN  f )
35  V;
where m is a diagonal matrix with um"m
m
1i +um"f 
m
2i on its diagonal, f is a diagonal matrix
with um"m
f
1i + um"f 
f
2i on its diagonal, and mf is a diagonal matrix with uf "m
m
1i + uf "f 
m
2i
(or equivalently um"m
f
1i + um"f 
f
2i) on its diagonal. Below, we use the following decomposition
of m and f :
k = uk"m
k
1 + uk"f
k
2 for k = male,female.
We estimate the male and female wage equations (3) and (4) by ordinary least squares (equa-
tion by equation) using consistent estimates of our selectivity correction terms (as Heckman,
1976). That is, we regress,
Dkyk = Dk

W^kk + vk + k

; for k = male,female,
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where W^k =
h
Zkj^1j^2
i
and k = uk"m(1  ^1)+ uk"f (2  ^2).3 Our parameter estimates are
therefore given by 0@ ^m
^f
1A =
0@ W^ 0mDmW^m 1 W^ 0mDmym
W^ 0fDfW^f
 1
W^ 0fDfyf
1A
The standard errors of these parameter estimates are corrected both for the non-scalar covari-
ance matrix (heteroscedasticity and serial correlation) and for the fact that we use consistently
estimated selectivity correction terms. In the Appendix, we derive the asymptotic distribution0@ ^m
^f
1A
X;Z
a! N
0B@
0@ m
f
1A ;
0@ (W 0mDmWm) 1W 0mDm
W 0fDfWf
 1
W 0fDf
1A (V +R)
0@ (W 0mDmWm) 1W 0mDm
W 0fDfWf
 1
W 0fDf
1A0
1CA :
V is the covariance matrix, given above, and
R =
0@ m1 Xm m2 Xf m3
f1Xm 
f
2Xf 
f
3
1A I(m; f ; "m"f ) 1
0@ m1 Xm m2 Xf m3
f1Xm 
f
2Xf 
f
3
1A0 ;
where I(m; f ; "m"f )
 1 denotes the inverse of the information matrix from our rst stage bivari-
ate probit model, Xk =
26664
x0k1
...
x0kn
37775 (the matrix of explanatory variables related to the decision to
participate), k1 and 
k
2 are dened above, and 
k
3 is a diagonal matrix with 
k
3i on its diagonal.
Here k3i is dened as
k3 (x
0
mim; x
0
fif ) = uk"m
(
1q
1 2"m"f
3i(1i +
x0mim "m"f x0fif
1 2"m"f
)
)
+ uk"f
(
1q
1 2"m"f
3i(2i +
x0fif "m"f x0mim
1 2"m"f
)
)
:
When deriving the correction required to deal with the fact that we use estimated sample se-
lectivity correction terms, we recognize that k1i and 
k
2i (introduced when describing the con-
ditional variances/covariances of uk) are related to the derivatives of the conditional expecta-
tion of the error term,uk; with respect to the male and female selection parameters m and f ,
specically,
@

uk"m1i+uk"f 2i

@m
=  k1ixmi and
@

uk"m1i+uk"f 2i

@f
=  k2ixfi (where k1i 
 @

uk"m1i+uk"f 2i

@(x0mim)
and k2i   
@

uk"m1i+uk"f 2i

@(x0fif )
). Correspondingly, we dened k3i 
3Alternatively a GLS procedure could have been developed. Asymptotically e¢ cient MLE estimates can be
obtained using a one-step e¢ cient Newton iteration from our OLS estimates.
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 @

uk"m1i+uk"f 2i

@("m"f )
as it relates to the derivative of the conditional expectation of the error
term with respect to the remaining parameter in our bivariate probit model.
For the computation of the covariance matrix using the two-step estimator, we require con-
sistent estimates of the individual parameters 2um ; 
2
uf
; umuf ; um"m , um"f , uf "m , and uf "f .
Dene ek = Dk(yk   W^k^k): A consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the outcome
equation errors (um; uf ) is given by
b2uk = e0kekPni=1 dki + ^k, for k = male, femalebumuf = e0mefPn
i=1 dmidfi
+ ^mf ;
(7)
where ^k =
Pn
i=1 dki(^uk"m ^
k
1i+ ^uk"f ^
k
2i)=
Pn
i=1 dki and ^mf =
Pn
i=1 dmidfi(^uf "m ^
m
1i + ^uf "f ^
m
2i )=Pn
i=1 dmidfi (application of Slutskys theorem and consistency result of the bivariate probit esti-
mates). Consistent estimates of the correlations are given by
^umuf = bumuf =(bumbuf );
^uk"l = buk"l=buk , for k; l = male, female,
where it is noted, as in Greene (1981), that there are no restrictions to ensure that the estimates
of the correlations are restricted to lie between [ 1; 1]:
To analyze the gender wage di¤erences using the Oaxaca-Ransom-Neumark wage-gap decom-
position technique we need to formulate a pooled regression model, which appropriately accounts
for sample selectivity bias. The aim is to obtain the nondiscriminatory wage structure as a suit-
ably weighted average of the male and female wage structure (Neumark (1988)) net of selectivity.
Our pooled regression model, can be written as
D

ym
yf

= D
240@ Zm 1j2 0
Zf 0 1j2
1Ap


+

m
f
35 (8)
where p reects the nondiscriminatory wage structure,  = (um"m ; um"f ; uf "m ; uf "f )
0:4 Our
pooled regression model contains a composite error term, which in part reects any di¤erences
between the true and nondiscriminatory wage structure. Specically,
dikik = dik
 
vik + z
0
ki(k   p)

k = male, female,
4The presence of gender dummies in the pooled regression model, as discussed by Fortin (2006), is equivalent to
noting that the rst two columns of Zm and Zf are given by the dummy variables male and female respectively,
with k suitably modied to incorporate this "additional" variable.
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where vik (dened as before) satises E(vkijdki = 1; xki; zki) = 0: By construction E(kijdki =
1; xki; zki) = z
0
ki(k   p); k = male, female. The least squares estimate of the nondiscriminatory
wage structure, ^p can be shown to equal
^p = 
0^m + (I   
0)^f ; (9)
where

0 =

(DmZm)
0Mm(DmZm) + (DfZf )
0Mf (DfZf )
 1
(DmZm)
0Mm(DmZm):
The weighting matrix, involves the idempotent matrices Mk = I   k(0kk) 10k with k =
Dk [1j2] for k = male, female. This weighting matrix, is comparable to that discussed in Oaxaca
and Ransom (1994) and Neumark (1988)5 with the notable di¤erence that it controls for sample
selectivity, by the inclusion of Mk . This matrix appears in the partitioned regression formula
of the parameter estimates ^k obtained from the sample selectivity corrected wage regressions
^k = [(DkZk)
0Mk(DkZk)]
 1 (DkZk)0Mk(Dkyk):
Empirical application of the gender gap decomposition using the Oaxaca-Ransom-Neumark
procedure in the presence of sample selectivity to date (e.g., Mavromaras and Rudolph, 1997) has
not accounted for the distinctive and jointly determined participation rules of men and women.
Moreover, it has been the practice to impose in the pooled regression model identical parameter(s)
on the selectivity correction. Since the objective is to obtain a non-discriminatory wage structure
as a suitably weighted average between the male and female wage structure net of selection bias,
our approach is needed. Not accounting for distinctive participation rules, just like ignoring a
gender dummy in the pooled regression, could lead to the pooled coe¢ cients capturing part of
the betweenmale and female e¤ects (particularly with large gender di¤erences in explanatory
variables and/or participation rules) (see also Fortin, 2006). The asymptotic covariance matrix
for the resulting two-step estimator of p (and ) can be derived along similar lines as before (see
Appendix).
The Oaxaca-Ransom-Neumark procedure entails decomposing the observed male-female wage
gap, ym   yf (= E(ymjdm = 1)  E(yf jdf = 1)) as
ym yf =

(zm   zf )0p

+

z0m(m   p)

+

z0f (p   f )

+[E(umjdm = 1)  E(uf jdf = 1)] ; (10)
5Using our notation, their weighting matrix is given by
(DmZm)
0(DmZm) + (DfZf )
0(DfZf )
 1
(DmZm)
0(DmZm):
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where zm and zf are the average endowments of the wage determining attributes for wage work-
ers, i.e., E(Zmjdm = 1)0 and E(Zf jdf = 1)0 respectively. The rst term gives an estimate of the
productivity di¤erences between the two groups in terms of p, the nondiscriminatory wage struc-
ture; the second term is an estimate of the male advantage over and above the nondiscriminatory
wage structure and the third term that of the female disadvantage. The remainder is due to the
self-selection correction.6 The observed male-female wage gap minus this self-selection correction
gives the o¤ered male-female wage gap.
In the Appendix a glossary can be found for the standard errors associated with the various
components of the wage decomposition. This necessitates an evaluation of the covariance between
the pooled parameter estimates, ^p; and (^m; ^f ); which can be derived easily using (9).
3 Data
The analysis uses Canadian data from the 1991 Census Public Use Microdata Family File (PUMF),
which provides detailed information on socioeconomic characteristics on 345,351 families (3% of
the population). While Baker et al., 1995, and Gunderson, 1998, amongst others, document a
decline in the gender earnings di¤erential in Canada7, discrepancies between male and female
wages still exist in Canada. This study restricts its attention to married couples, aged 17-65
years: a total of 161,928 couples. This subsample is chosen with a view to emphasize the impact
of intra-household correlations on the estimation of gender specic earnings functions and the
decomposition of the gender earning di¤erences. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the variables
used in this study and their descriptive statistics separated by gender and employment status
(paid workerversus not paid worker).
The employment status paid workeris dened as an individual who worked at least 1 week
in 1990 as paid employee, is not attending school full time, and has reported positive annual
earnings. The participation rates for men and women in the subsample equal 78 and 65 percent
respectively, which are slightly below the overall participation rates for the age group (80 percent
6Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) discuss additional ways of decomposing the observed wage-gap as they consider
various decompositions of the gender di¤erences in selectivity e¤ects in addition. This recognizes the fact that the
gender di¤erences in selection may represent discrimination as well.
7The decline has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the labour market participation of women (from 29%
in 1961 to 60% in 1996), a stronger labour force attachment by women workers in the 1990s (fewer children and
shorter work interruptions after birth), and a substantial gain in womens wage-determining or productivity-related
characteristics (Statistics Canada, 1999).
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for men and 68 percent for women). As dependent variable in the earnings equations we take the
log of annual employment income received in 1990.8 The observed log earnings di¤erential is 0:751
(representing an observed earnings di¤erential of CA$15399:75). Given that annual earnings is
the product of number of weeks worked, the hourly wage rate, and weekly hours of work, we will
need to control for labor supply e¤ects in our earnings equation. We do this by including the
number of weeks worked in 1990 (men working on average 46.5 weeks versus 42.9 for women) and
a dummy variable indicating whether the individual worked mainly full-time weeks in 1990 or not
(96.8% of men working full time, versus 73.4% of women).
Most of the explanatory variables in the earnings equation are standard in the literature.
We use the usual aspects of human capital: schooling, potential work experience (age-6-years
of schooling), and experience squared. The major eld of study, available for individuals with
a postsecondary qualication, provides for a less traditional set of human capital controls we
consider in addition for the earnings function yielding a more qualitativemeasure to the human
capital variable years of schooling. The principal elds of study listed by men are engineering
and commerce and administration, by women, secretarial and nursing.
This set of human capital regressors is augmented by other factors that may inuence earnings.
The ability to speak Canadas o¢ cial languages might well be expected to lead to higher earnings
(Shapiro and Stelcner, 1981, 1987, 1997). These e¤ects are indicated by three dummy variables on
language: French only, bilingual, and neither o¢ cial language with the reference category given
by English only. We also consider internal and international migration e¤ects (see e.g., Baker and
Benjamin, 1994, Bloom et al., 1995, and Shaprio and Stelcner, 1995) which we capture by two
sets of dummy variables. To control for di¤erences across labor markets in work opportunities,
cost of living, and other pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors, a number of dummy variables for
city size and geographic region are included. Including these geographic variables permits one to
ascertain systematic regional or city-size di¤erences in earnings.
Obviously the augmented set of human capital explanatory variables play a role in the partic-
ipation decision as well. Additional variables we consider to a¤ect the participation decision are
family size, presence of children and non-labour income (total family income less earnings of the
couple). These regressors are expected to inuence the reservation wage of an individual and not
the o¤ered wage.
8A well-known problem with using Census data for earnings equations in that information on the usual hours
of work last yearare not available.
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It is important to emphasize that the measure of wage discrimination implied by the decompo-
sition of the earnings gap is limited is two important ways. First, di¤erences in wage determining
attributes are taken as given (exogenous) and are not measured explicitly as reecting premarket
factors, discriminatory or otherwise, that inuence the acquisition of productive characteristics.
Gender segregation in the educational system and training programs no doubt has a strong impact
on labour market outcomes. Second, attempting to decompose the gender di¤erences using the
above set of regressors will enable us to obtain a measure of discrimination in the broad sense
of unequal pay for equal productivity generating traits(using Shapiro and Stelcners, 1981, ter-
minology), implicitly assuming that males and females are perfectly substitutable labour inputs.
A narrower measure of discrimination in the sense of unequal pay for equal workwill require
the introduction of variables which standardize for di¤erent working environments. Specically,
we consider the e¤ect of introducing controls for occupation and industry. To the extent that
women are crowded into (lowpaying) occupations and industries, the e¤ect of this segregation
will be reected as a male attribute advantage and the measured degree of wage discrimination
will be lower than that obtained without these variables. Managerial, natural science, machin-
ing, construction, and transport occupations are more prevalent among men, whereas teaching,
medicine and health and services are more prevalent among women. Employed women are found
principally in the health and social services industry, retail trade, manufacturing and educational
services, employed men are found principally in the manufacturing industry, construction, retail
and wholesale trade.
4 Empirical Results
Before turning our discussion to the gender decomposition of the wage di¤erential, we rst turn
to the estimation of the selection and wage earning equations themselves. In our discussion of the
results of the selection and wage earning regressions we focus in particular on the features that
distinguish this study from others in this area rather than elaborating on all parameter estimates
in detail.
Table A.2 in the Appendix provides the results for the selection of men and women into paid
employment. The rst two columns provide gender specic probit maximum likelihood estimates.
A pooled probit regression, where we allow for gender specic heterogeneity, is reported in the
third column. The results in this column provide clear evidence that male and female participation
decisions are di¤erent (even when a gender dummy is included in the pooled probit model) and
13
that gender specic heterogeneity is present. The LR test statistic of identical participation rules,
which asymptotically is distributed as a 2(37); equals 6722:4 which is highly signicant.9 The
nal two columns provide the bivariate probit maximum likelihood estimates which accounts for
correlations among spousesunobserved characteristics. The highly signicant parameter estimate
of "m"f ; 0:233, reveals that the unobservables in the participation decision of men and women
are clearly correlated. The positive correlation found indicates that unobserved factors positively
a¤ecting the husbandspaid employment status a¤ect his wifes paid employment status positively
as well, pointing to similarity of partnersunobserved skills. Whether we account of intrahousehold
correlations of the unobservables or not, the selection parameter estimates of (m; f ) remain fairly
stable.
The usual ndings are obtained for selection of men and women into paid employment. Higher
educational attainment increases participation in paid employment.10 Variables considered to af-
fect the participation decision without a¤ecting the wage o¤er: family size, presence of children,
age and education of spouse, and non-labour income are jointly highly signicant and are of the
expected sign. Having young children (younger than 6 years) in particular reduces the female
participation in paid labour. While children of school age also signicantly reduce her participa-
tion, their e¤ect is reduced considerably as they become older. Finally, non-labour income has a
signicant negative impact on both men and womens participation. Noteworthy is that the use of
an alternative denition of unearned income "household income minus the individuals earnings"
yield signicant di¤erences between the individual and bivariate probit parameter estimates. Due
to the correlatedness of the selection errors of men and women, the use of such a denition of
unearned income should be avoided: the resulting endogeneity of such a variable (emanating from
spousal income) would render both the individual and bivariate probit estimates inconsistent.
This is a fact commonly ignored in other studies where the joint decision process faced by men
and women is not taken into account.
In Table 1, three sets of estimation results are provided for the base human capital model.
They represent the estimated earning functions for men and women under three alternative selec-
9The gender specic probit estimation results provide estimates of the male and female selection parameters up
to scale, or m="m and f="f . In order to test whether the male and female selection parameters are identical,
H0 : m = f ; we do not want to impose identical variances. Consequently, the pooled probit allows for distinct
variances for men and women where for identication purposes one of them is normalized to 1.
10This has been highlighted through the use of dummy variables reecting the school attainment, where university
education is considered to be above other non-university, and attainment of a degree, certicate or diploma is
considered to be at a higher level than year completed or attended without an educational qualication.
14
tivity correction paradigms : In the columns labelled OLS, no sample selectivity correction is
introduced; in the columns labelled Independent Selectivitythe standard Heckman selectivity
correction terms are included; in the columns labelled Dependent Selectivityselectivity correc-
tions are introduced which account for the spouses correlated labour market decision. The table
provides the parameter estimates for the human capital variables, the labour supply, and sample
selectivity correction terms.
The standard Heckman selection result reveal that sample selectivity corrections are called
for, since the parameters on the inverse Mills ratio are signicantly di¤erent from zero. The
negative coe¢ cients indicate that unobservables captured by the error terms, which encourage
participation in the wage sector, are associated with lower earnings. These negative correlations
are found in the augmented (dependent) selectivity model as well, no signicant di¤erences are
observed. The estimates for (um"m ; uf "f ) equal ( 0:27; 0:35) when we allow for intrahousehold
correlations versus ( 0:28; 0:34) when we do not. We nd a positive correlation between the
unobservables in the male and female wage equation, estimated at 0:270; revealing a similarity of
spouses unobservable productivity enhancing skills as with the participation decision. We also
nd signicant, though much smaller, intrahousehold correlations (um"f ; uf "m); estimated at
( 0:09; 0:03):
Despite the fact that the hypothesis of no sample selection bias has to be rejected both for men
and women, the returns to education (given by the estimate on the years of schooling) are fairly
stable across the three selection correction paradigms, revealing a lower return to education for
men, 3.7%, than women, 5.3%. Among the human capital variables, in particular the potential
experience parameters are a¤ected by the inclusion of selectivity corrections. The returns to
education for women (men) show a marginally signicant upward (downwards) bias when no
selection correction is considered. The introduction of controlling variables on languages, region,
city size, immigration and migration did not signicantly a¤ect the returns to education of men
and women, the controls were jointly highly signicant. As they may contribute towards explaining
the observed wage di¤erential we include them. Their estimates reveal that for men and women
earnings are highest (ceterus paribus) in the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia, and in
metropolitan areas. Immigration reduces the earnings as does (for men) the inability to speak
Canadas o¢ cial languages. While the negative e¤ect of immigration on earnings is stronger
for more recent immigrants, the e¤ect is found for all immigrant cohorts, supporting the rather
pessimistic picture of the immigrant experience in the Canadian labour market portrayed by Baker
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Human Capital Model
OLS Independent Dependent
Selectivity Selectivity
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Human Capital variables
Potential Experience 0:035
(0:001)
0:022
(0:001)
0:032
(0:001)
0:018
(0:001)
0:032
(0:001)
0:018
(0:001)
Potential Experience2=100  0:051
(0:001)
 0:035
(0:002)
 0:043
(0:002)
 0:021
(0:002)
 0:043
(0:002)
 0:021
(0:002)
Years of Schooling 0:036
(0:001)
0:055
(0:001)
0:036
(0:001)
0:053
(0:001)
0:037
(0:001)
0:053
(0:001)
University Degree 0:232
(0:007)
0:245
(0:008)
0:232
(0:007)
0:239
(0:009)
0:230
(0:007)
0:239
(0:009)
Vocational Training 0:046
(0:005)
0:007
(0:007)
0:040
(0:005)
 0:006
(0:007)
0:039
(0:005)
 0:007
(0:007)
Labour Supply controls
Weeks 0:029
(0:000)
0:035
(0:000)
0:029
(0:000)
0:035
(0:000)
0:029
(0:000)
0:035
(0:000)
Full-time 0:641
(0:017)
0:625
(0:006)
0:635
(0:011)
0:614
(0:006)
0:635
(0:011)
0:614
(0:006)
Sample selection controls
1 [um"m ; uf "m ]  0:198
(0:019)
0:000  0:187
(0:019)
 0:024
(0:004)
2 [um"f ; uf "f ] 0:000  0:270
(0:016)
 0:061
(0:003)
 0:272
(0:016)
2um 0:492 0:492 0:490
2uf 0:585 0:617 0:618
um;uf 0:000 0:000 0:270
Other controls; constant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
R2 0:319 0:460 0:320 0:461 0:321 0:462
 Other variables included are: language, region of residence, citysize, mobility and
immigration dummies
Table 1: Estimated earning functions by gender. Dependent variable is the log annual earnings
in 1990. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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and Benjamin (1995). Bilingual men and women receive the highest earnings. Internal mobility
is associated with higher earnings for men and lower earnings for women.
In the Appendix, Table A.3 provides two additional set of results for the male and female
earnings functions with dependent selectivity in which further controls are introduced for eld of
study and occupational and industry. The introduction of these sets of controls has the obvious
e¤ect of reducing the returns to education relative to the base human capital model, in part
by introducing a more qualitative measure of education (elds of study), in part by netting
out occupational di¤erences.11 Men with postsecondary qualications in the elds of health,
engineering, commerce in particular fare better than their humanities, agriculture/biology, ne
arts, and education counterparts ceteris paribus. Similar ndings are observed for women with
postsecondary qualications where in addition the eld of nursing holds positive returns ceteris
paribus.
In Table 2, we present the decomposition results for the three earnings functions considered
using the three selectivity paradigms (without selectivity correction (OLS), using the standard
Heckman selectivity correction (independent selectivity), and using the augmented Heckman se-
lectivity correction where intrahousehold correlations are considered (dependent selectivity)). The
rst three rows in the table present the observed wage gap, the selectivity correction gap, and
the o¤ered wage gap. Using the pooled wage parameter estimates as the non-discriminatory wage
structure, we report the part of the wage gap that cannot be explained by di¤erences in endow-
ments, also labelled discrimination. This part of the wage gap, that is due to di¤erences in
the returns to productivity enhancing skills (coe¢ cients), is further disaggregated into the male
advantage over and above the nondiscriminatory wage structure (preferential treatment) and the
female disadvantage (discrimination). The decomposition results are provided for pooled wage
structures which include and which do not include a dummy variable. For comparison, we also
report the coe¢ cient gap where either the male or female wage structure is used as the non-
discriminatory wage structure as suggested by Oaxaca (1973). The table presents the coe¢ cient
gaps in levels (with associated standard errors) together with the percentage of the o¤ered wage
gap they represent.
The selectivity correction gap is signicant both using the standard Heckman selectivity cor-
rection (independent selectivity) and using the selectivity correction we propose that takes account
11The returns to education are 3.2% and 4.4% for men and women respectively after controlling for eld of study.
The returns to education for men and women are 2.8% and 2.7% respectively (not statistically di¤erent) after
controlling both for eld of study and occupational di¤erences.
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of the joint decision process faced by men and women (dependent selectivity). The dependent se-
lectivity correction appears to result in a larger selectivity gap (and thus smaller o¤ered wage gap)
compared to the independent selectivity correction, though the di¤erence is not signicant. When
sequentially we add controls in the earning functions for eld of study and occupation and indus-
try, we see a reduction (signicant) of the selectivity gap. The o¤ered wage gap is signicantly
lower than the observed wage gap, when accounting for selectivity corrections, signalling that part
of the observed wage di¤erences is a direct result of their di¤erential participation decisions.
The di¤erence in returns to productivity enhancing skills ("discrimination") in signicantly
larger when we use as the nondiscriminatory wage structure the pooled wage structure which
includes a gender dummy compared to when we use the pooled wage structure that does not
include a gender dummy. For the human capital model, this coe¢ cient gap amounts to 0.453
(or 60.3% of the o¤ered wage gap) with inclusion of a gender dummy versus 0.383 (or 51.0%)
without. Moreover, we observe that this observed signicant disparity, is reduced when selectivity
corrections are used that take account of the joint decision process faced by men and women.12 In
the human capital model with dependent selectivity, where the coe¢ cient gap amounts to 0.382
(or 56.2%) with inclusion of a gender dummy versus 0.377 (or 55.5%) without, the disparity is
even rendered insignicant. As conjectured, therefore, not accounting for distinctive participation
rules, just like ignoring a gender dummy in the pooled regression, lead to the pooled coe¢ cients
capturing part of the betweenmale and female e¤ects (particularly with large gender di¤erences
in explanatory variables and/or participation rules), thereby reducing the evidence of discrimina-
tion. Moreover, taking account of the distinctive participation rules of men and women as opposed
to introducing the standard pooled selectivity correction, reveals that a larger part of the level
of "discrimination" should be attributed to a market undervaluation of women (female penalty)
than a more favorable market evaluation of observed characteristics for men (male premium).
A further support for accounting for distinctive participation rules (and the inclusion of a
gender dummy) in the pooled regression, is the comparability of the level of "discrimination"
these models yield when compared to the level of "discrimination" when either the male or female
wage structure (selectivity corrected) is used as the nondiscriminatory wage structure. When
accounting for the distinctive participation rules in the pooled regression (dependent selectivity)
the use of the male and female wage structure as the nondiscriminatory wage in the human
12The dependent selectivity results allow for intrahousehold correlations. Quantitatively (e¢ ciency aside) the
results are similar when intrahousehold correlations are ignored while accounting for gender specic selectivity rules
in the pooled regressions.
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capital model yield levels of "discrimination" of 57.1% and 56.6% respectively, comparable to the
56.2% [55.5%] using the pooled wage structure inclusive [exclusive] of a gender dummy. When
no selectivity corrections are considered the use of the male and female wage structure as the
nondiscriminatory wage in the human capital model yield levels of "discrimination" of 61.2% and
61.1% respectively which only compare well with the use of the pooled wage structure inclusive
of a gender dummy, 60.3%. Not including a gender dummy in the pooled wage structure when no
selectivity corrections are considered yield levels of "discrimination" signicantly lower 51.0%. The
same holds true for the independent selectivity model. Accounting for the distinctive participation
rules in the pooled regression, in a way, controls for the omission of a gender dummy in the pooled
wage regression.
The results, when controls are added for eld of study, are fairly comparable to those obtained
for the base human capital model, and indicate that around 43.5% of the o¤ered wage gap can
be explained by di¤erences in endowments. When comparing these results to related Canadian
gender wage decomposition studies, we note that our focus on married couples results in a larger
part of the gender earnings gap being explained by wage-related characteristics.13
When additional controls for occupation and industry are added, we obtain signicant di¤er-
ences in the level of "discrimination" depending on the reference wage structure used, providing
evidence of the general concern with the Oaxaca decomposition approach that it is not invariant
to the reference wage used. Without selectivity correction the coe¢ cient gap equals 0.363 (or
48.3%) using male weights, 0.453 (or 60.3%) using female weight, and 0.405 (or 53.9%) using the
pooled weight including a gender dummy variable. The use of pooled weight without a gender
dummy variable seem to point to a much smaller level of "discrimination" equalling 0.234 (or
31.1%). With dependent selectivity correction the disparity is somewhat compressed, but still
present. The coe¢ cient gap equals 0.331 (or 46.0%) using male weights, 0.419 (or 58.2%) using
female weight, 0.371 (or 51.6%) using the pooled weight including a dummy variable, and 0.336
(or 46.7%) using the pooled weight excluding a dummy variable. Adding additional controls for
occupation and industry, though, does seem to reduce the evidence of wage discrimination. This
evidence of reduction in "discrimination" (in the narrower sense of unequal pay for equal work),
in particular, is strongly signicant when using either the male or the pooled wage structure
13For the period 1970-1990, studies like Baker et al. (1995), Gunderson (1998), Christodes and Swidinsky
(1994), Coish and Haile (1995), Grenier and Joseph (1993), Miller (1987), and Shapiro and Stelcner (1987), using
the standard decomposition technique, show that between 25 to 30 percent of the gender earnings gap in Canada
can be explained by wage-related characteristics.
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without a gender dummy as reference wage structure. The evidence of reduction is "discrimina-
tion" of adding controls for occupation and industry over and above controls for eld of study is
marginally signicant when using the pooled wage structure with a gender dummy as reference
wage structure.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we revisited the gender decomposition of wages in the presence of selection bias. We
developed appropriate sample selection corrections when the labor market decisions of spouses
are dependent, and discussed a two-step estimation strategy.
We follow Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) in using the pooled nondiscrimi-
natory wage structure in the gender decomposition analysis. Empirical application of the gender
gap decomposition using the Oaxaca-Ransom-Neumark procedure in the presence of sample selec-
tivity has not accounted for the distinctive and jointly determined participation rules of men and
women. We showed that not accounting for distinctive participation rules (and their joint deter-
minedness), just like ignoring a gender dummy in the pooled regression, reduced the evidence of
discrimination, as the nondiscriminatory wage structure captures part of the betweenmale and
female e¤ects (particularly with large gender di¤erences in explanatory variables and/or partici-
pation rules). The inuence that husbandsparticipation decision has on the female participation
decision highlights the importance of using data on both spouses for the analysis of the gender
wage gap. Adding additional controls for eld of study does not signicantly a¤ect the decompo-
sition analysis, but there does appear some reduction in "discrimination" (in the narrower sense
of unequal pay for equal work) when additional controls for occupation and industry are added.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we present various results discussed in this paper. First, we discuss the
derivation of the asymptotic distribution of the extended sample selectivity correction model.
Next, we provide a discussion of the pooled sample selectivity correction model, followed by a
glossary for the standard errors of the decomposition terms. The tables A.1A.3 can be found at
the end of this Appendix.
A.1 Derivation of the standard errors of the two-step procedure
Two corrections need to be made to the standard errors obtained by a standard linear regression
package, when applying OLS to our model
D
0@ ym
yf
1A = D
240@ Wm 0
0 Wf
1A0@ m
f
1A+
0@ vm
vf
1A35 ; (A.1)
where D is a diagonal matrix with elements (dm1; :::; dmN ; df1; :::; dfN) indicating selection into
the group of wage earners, N equals the number of households, Wk = [Zkj1j2] and k =
0k; uk"m ; uk"f
0 with k = male, female. The rst correction emanates from the fact that the
errors in our wage regression are non-spherical. Specically, our covariance matrix, exhibits
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the form,
V ar
24D
0@ vm
vf
1A35  V ar
240@ Dm 0
0 Df
1A0@ vm
vf
1A35 (A.2)
=
24 Dm  2umIN  m DmDf (umuf IN  mf )
DmDf (umuf IN  mf ) Df (2uf IN  f )
35  V:
The second correction emanates from the fact that we use the predicted sample selectivity cor-
rection terms 1(Xm^m; Xf ^f ; ^"m"f ) and 2(Xm^m; Xf ^f ; ^"m"f ) in place of the true selectivity
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correction terms. That is, our estimated regression model is given by
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1A35 (A.3)
where W^k =
h
Zkj^1j^2
i
; with the error vector  composed as
k =k + k
k =uk"m
h
1(Xmm; Xf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^m; Xf 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(A.4)
+ uk"f
h
2(Xmm; Xff ; "m"f )  2(Xm^m; Xf ^f ; ^"m"f )
i
,
k = male,female.
Here, we derive the asymptotic distribution of the two step estimator: We consider0@ pNm (bm   m)p
Nf (bf   f )
1A
=
0@ W^ 0mDmW^mNm 0
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where Nk =
PN
i=1 dki, k = male, female as N; Nm and Nf !1.
Obviously the asymptotic distribution of the rst step estimator (^0m; ^0f ; ^"m"f )  $^ plays a
crucial role. Specically, the multivariate probit maximum likelihood estimator b$ conditional on
X and Z is asymptotic normally distributed, with mean $ = (0m; 0f ; "m"f ) and variance given
by the inverse of the information matrix, I 1$$. More concisely, using the simplifying notation
qki = 2dki   1
!ki = qki (x
0
kik)
"m"f = qmiqfi"m"f ;
(A.6)
and a standard asymptotic expansion for MLE estimators, we obtain
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where
Pn
i=1 gi($) denotes the score of the log-likelihood function.
The consistency of our rst step estimates b$ = (b0m; b0f ; b"m"f )0 ensure that
plim
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N!1
1
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cW 0kDkcWk = lim
Nk!1
1
Nk
W 0kDkWk; (A.8)
where Wk =
h
Zk 1 2
i
by Slutsky theorem. We assume this to be a nite positive denite
matrix (imposes a regularity condition on the regressors). Moreover, these conditions ensure that
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where Nmf =
PN
i=1 dmidfi; c = lim
N!1
Nmfp
NmNf
0 < c  1; and V; the covariance matrix of E(Dv);
is partitioned as
24 Vmm Vmf
Vfm Vff
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To derive the limiting distribution of
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1CA ; we note that a one term Taylor expansion
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Given the asymptotic distribution of the multivariate probit maximum likelihood estimator,
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where ck = limN!1 NmN ; 0 < ck  1 k = male and female.14 Since m and f are correlated for
individuals coming from the same household, W^
0
mDmmp
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are asymptotically correlated
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as well. In particular,
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where cmf = limN!1
p
NmNf
N ; 0 < cmf  1:
The sample selectivity correction we proposed in this study allows us to ascertain that  and 
are uncorrelated. Consequently, we can conclude that conditional on the data; b is asymptotically
normal with mean  and asymptotic variance given by
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Let us turn to the important result implied by our sample selectivity correction, the uncorre-
latedness of  and : First, we note that  is asymptotically a linear function of (df ; dm) on account
of (A.7) and (A.10). Next, we realize that our sample selectivity correction dened v = (v0m; v0f );
with
vmi = umi   dfiE(umijdmi = 1; dfi = 1; xi; zi)  (1  dfi)E(umijdmi = 1; dfi = 0; xi; zi) (A.15)
vfi = ufi   dmiE(ufijdmi = 1; dfi = 1; xi; zi)  (1  dmi)E(ufijdmi = 1; dfi = 0; xi; zi);
for i = 1; :::; N . Clearly, these formulations show that  is uncorrelated with (df ; dm): This conve-
nient result is absent when the standard selectivity correction is applied, since umi E(umijdmi =
1; xi; zi) in general is still correlated with dfi while being uncorrelated with dmi:
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A.2 The pooled earnings regression
Our pooled regression model, is given by
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where p reects the nondiscriminatory wage structure and  = (um"m ; um"f ; uf "m ; uf "f )
0:
Using the partitioned regression result,
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Since the partitioned regression result of the male and female wage regression, similarly allowed
us to denote
^k =

(DkZk)
0Mk (DkZk)
 1
(DkZk)
0Mk (Dkyk) ; k = male, female, (A.19)
we realize that the nondiscriminatory wage structure indeed is a weighted average of the male
and female wage structure, ^p = 
0^m + (I   
0)^f , where

0 =

(DmZm)
0Mm (DmZm) + (DfZf )
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(DmZm)
0Mm (DmZm) : (A.20)
Given the limiting distribution of  = (0m; 0m; 0)0 obtained in the previous section, the
limiting distribution of ^p readily follows, as ^p = [
0jI   
0j0] ^:
A.3 Glossary, standard errors of the decomposition terms
We denote AVar(bk) = Vk; ACov(bk; bl) = Vkl, k; l = male, female. Recognizing, that the nondis-
criminatory wage structure bp is given by a weighted average of the male and female wage struc-
ture, ^p = 
0^m+(I 
0)^f ; we obtain the following expressions for the variance associated with
the distinct components of the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition discussed in the text:
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(2) Coe¢ cients (male advantage) := z0m(m   p)
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(3) Coe¢ cients (female disadvantage) := z0f (p   f )
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(4) Coe¢ cients (2)+(3) := z0m(m   p) + z0f (p   f )
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A.4 Tables
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Not Paid Men Paid Men Not Paid Wom Paid Wom
Endogenous Variables: N= 31635 N=130293 N= 52233 N=109695
Paid worker 0:000 1:000 80:5% 0:000 1:000 67:7%
Log yearly earnings 10:280 (0:838) 9:529 (1:040)
Exogenous Variables:
B Selection eqn only
Family Structure:
HH size 3:163 (1:222) 3:342 (1:141) 3:373 (1:235) 3:275 (1:120)
No. children <6 0:271 (0:582) 0:357 (0:640) 0:397 (0:687) 0:314 (0:600)
No. children 6-14 0:426 (0:782) 0:532 (0:826) 0:510 (0:832) 0:513 (0:813)
No. children 15-17 0:140 (0:391) 0:161 (0:412) 0:140 (0:389) 0:165 (0:416)
Non-labour income 0:16 (0:21) 0:08 (0:13) 0:12 (0:18) 0:08 (0:14)
B Selection/earnings eqn
Human Capital:
Age 46:62 (12:77) 41:26 (10:56) 42:40 (12:28) 38:47 (10:00)
Potential Experience 29:84 (14:72) 23:33 (11:90) 25:89 (13:80) 20:50 (11:09)
Years of Schooling 11:774 (4:587) 12:928 (4:079) 11:518 (3:741) 12:970 (3:396)
University Degree 0:132 (0:339) 0:160 (0:366) 0:079 (0:270) 0:133 (0:340)
Vocational Training 0:201 (0:401) 0:239 (0:427) 0:105 (0:307) 0:134 (0:341)
Linguistics: (ref English)
French only 0:257 (0:437) 0:257 (0:437) 0:295 (0:456) 0:240 (0:427)
Bilingual 0:345 (0:475) 0:376 (0:484) 0:342 (0:474) 0:383 (0:486)
Neither domestic lang 0:190 (0:392) 0:162 (0:368) 0:153 (0:360) 0:174 (0:379)
Mobility: (ref CD same)
Prov. same, CD not 0:119 (0:324) 0:119 (0:324) 0:119 (0:324) 0:119 (0:324)
Prov. di¤erent 0:514 (0:500) 0:602 (0:489) 0:546 (0:498) 0:603 (0:489)
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics by gender and employment status. Means and standard devia-
tions in parentheses.
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Not Paid Men Paid Men Not Paid Wom Paid Wom
Immigration: (ref born)
Immigrated <1961 0:138 (0:345) 0:124 (0:330) 0:199 (0:400) 0:134 (0:341)
Immig. 1961-1970 0:176 (0:381) 0:198 (0:398) 0:144 (0:351) 0:177 (0:382)
Immig. 1971-1980 0:013 (0:115) 0:007 (0:084) 0:019 (0:135) 0:008 (0:091)
Immig. 1981-1985 0:075 (0:264) 0:053 (0:224) 0:054 (0:227) 0:038 (0:192)
Immig. 1986-1990 0:049 (0:216) 0:054 (0:227) 0:047 (0:212) 0:052 (0:222)
Province: (ref Atlantic)
Quebec 0:049 (0:215) 0:056 (0:231) 0:048 (0:213) 0:058 (0:234)
Ontario 0:018 (0:134) 0:018 (0:133) 0:020 (0:139) 0:019 (0:137)
Prairies 0:036 (0:187) 0:025 (0:157) 0:039 (0:193) 0:026 (0:160)
British Columbia 0:043 (0:202) 0:049 (0:215) 0:049 (0:216) 0:047 (0:211)
Census Metropolitan 0:100 (0:301) 0:118 (0:323) 0:111 (0:315) 0:124 (0:329)
B Earnings eqn only
Labour Supply:
Weeks 46:525 (10:904) 42:895 (14:031)
Full-time 0:968 (0:176) 0:734 (0:442)
Field of study:
Fine Arts 0:014 (0:116) 0:030 (0:170)
Humanities 0:021 (0:145) 0:026 (0:160)
Social Science 0:037 (0:189) 0:036 (0:186)
Commerce-Admin 0:074 (0:262) 0:060 (0:237)
Secretarial 0:004 (0:063) 0:080 (0:271)
Agriculture/Biology 0:021 (0:144) 0:018 (0:132)
Engineer 0:254 (0:435) 0:019 (0:137)
Nursing 0:003 (0:052) 0:070 (0:255)
Other Health 0:013 (0:112) 0:026 (0:158)
Maths/Physics 0:020 (0:140 0:009 (0:096
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics by gender and employment status (Contd).
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Paid Men Paid Wom
Occupation (ref Clerical)
Managerial, administrative and related 0:178 (0:382) 0:110 (0:313)
Natural sciences, engineering and mathematics 0:066 (0:249) 0:017 (0:131)
Social sciences and related 0:014 (0:117) 0:027 (0:163)
Teaching and related 0:035 (0:184) 0:073 (0:260)
Medicine and health 0:016 (0:124) 0:098 (0:297)
Artistic, literary, recreational and related 0:012 (0:108) 0:012 (0:109)
Sales 0:083 (0:276) 0:085 (0:279)
Services 0:080 (0:272) 0:131 (0:338)
Farming and Horticulture 0:013 (0:115) 0:013 (0:115)
Other Primary 0:024 (0:153) 0:002 (0:048)
Processing 0:044 (0:206) 0:020 (0:138)
Machining, product fabricating, and assembling 0:135 (0:342) 0:038 (0:191)
Construction 0:109 (0:311) 0:003 (0:053)
Transport equipment operating 0:065 (0:247) 0:008 (0:090)
Other Occupations 0:066 (0:249) 0:024 (0:153)
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics by gender and employment status (Contd).
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Paid Men Paid Wom
Industry (ref Govt Services)
Agriculture 0:018 (0:134) 0:022 (0:147)
Other Primary 0:043 (0:202) 0:009 (0:093)
Manufacturing 0:223 (0:417) 0:111 (0:314)
Construction 0:104 (0:305) 0:020 (0:140)
Transportation and storage 0:069 (0:253) 0:020 (0:140)
Communications and other utilities 0:049 (0:217) 0:028 (0:166)
Wholesale trade 0:061 (0:240) 0:031 (0:174)
Retail trade 0:092 (0:289) 0:136 (0:343)
Finance, insurance and real estate 0:045 (0:208) 0:089 (0:284)
Business services 0:049 (0:215) 0:054 (0:226)
Educational services 0:057 (0:233) 0:109 (0:311)
Health and social services 0:029 (0:167) 0:171 (0:376)
Accommodation, food and beverage services 0:025 (0:155) 0:062 (0:242)
Other services 0:039 (0:193) 0:065 (0:246)
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics by gender and employment status (Contd).
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Probit Probit Bivariate Probit
Men Women Pooled Men Women
2"m (
2
"f
= 1) 1:000 0:770
(0:009)
1:000
"m;"f 0:000 0:000 0:233
(0:005)
Human capital
Secondary School, with Grad Cert 0:232
(0:013)
0:313
(0:010)
0:293
(0:009)
0:225
(0:013)
0:306
(0:010)
Secondary School, with Trade Cert 0:233
(0:016)
0:389
(0:020)
0:356
(0:014)
0:233
(0:016)
0:377
(0:020)
Other Non-Univ, no Certicate 0:065
(0:017)
0:290
(0:014)
0:227
(0:012)
0:053
(0:017)
0:282
(0:014)
Other Non-Univ, with Trade Cert 0:159
(0:013)
0:305
(0:016)
0:268
(0:012)
0:154
(0:013)
0:300
(0:016)
Other Non-Univ, with Other Cert 0:280
(0:015)
0:495
(0:012)
0:451
(0:010)
0:280
(0:015)
0:485
(0:011)
Univ, no Cert 0:084
(0:022)
0:249
(0:020)
0:201
(0:016)
0:079
(0:022)
0:248
(0:020)
Univ, with below BA Cert 0:171
(0:019)
0:483
(0:016)
0:402
(0:013)
0:168
(0:018)
0:481
(0:016)
Univ, with BA Cert 0:106
(0:014)
0:461
(0:014)
0:342
(0:011)
0:109
(0:014)
0:462
(0:014)
Univ, with above BA Cert 0:181
(0:031)
0:593
(0:032)
0:458
(0:025)
0:181
(0:031)
0:600
(0:032)
Univ, with MA Cert 0:202
(0:024)
0:476
(0:029)
0:391
(0:021)
0:212
(0:023)
0:489
(0:029)
Univ, with PhD Cert 0:543
(0:048)
0:670
(0:094)
0:739
(0:051)
0:563
(0:047)
0:667
(0:093)
Family Characteristics
HH size 0:163
(0:007)
0:031
(0:006)
0:092
(0:005)
0:162
(0:007)
0:032
(0:006)
No. children <6  0:205
(0:009)
 0:405
(0:008)
 0:363
(0:007)
 0:205
(0:009)
 0:407
(0:008)
No. children 6-14  0:213
(0:008)
 0:208
(0:007)
 0:234
(0:006)
 0:211
(0:008)
 0:209
(0:007)
No. children 15-17  0:186
(0:012)
 0:095
(0:011)
 0:146
(0:009)
 0:184
(0:012)
 0:094
(0:011)
Non-labour income  1:321
(0:025)
 0:654
(0:025)
 1:038
(0:020)
 1:325
(0:025)
 0:657
(0:025)
Other controls; constant               
 Other variables included are: age, agesq, language, region of residence, citysize mobility,
immigration dummies, age and education of spouse, and gender dummy (pooled probit)
Table A.2: Selection of into Paid Employment by gender. Numbers in parentheses are standard
errors.
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Human Capital Controlling for Controlling for
Model Field of Study Field of Study
Occ & Indust
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Human Capital variables
Potential Experience 0:032
(0:001)
0:018
(0:001)
0:034
(0:001)
0:019
(0:001)
0:029
(0:001)
0:014
(0:001)
Potential Experience2=100  0:043
(0:002)
 0:021
(0:002)
 0:046
(0:002)
 0:024
(0:002)
 0:038
(0:002)
 0:016
(0:002)
Years of Schooling 0:037
(0:001)
0:053
(0:001)
0:032
(0:001)
0:044
(0:001)
0:028
(0:001)
0:027
(0:001)
University Degree 0:230
(0:007)
0:239
(0:009)
0:208
(0:008)
0:284
(0:009)
0:161
(0:008)
0:217
(0:009)
Vocational Training 0:039
(0:005)
 0:007
(0:007)
 0:067
(0:007)
 0:041
(0:008)
 0:033
(0:007)
 0:031
(0:008)
Labour Supply controls
Weeks 0:029
(0:000)
0:035
(0:000)
0:029
(0:000)
0:034
(0:000)
0:029
(0:000)
0:033
(0:000)
Full-time 0:635
(0:011)
0:614
(0:006)
0:627
(0:011)
0:630
(0:006)
0:579
(0:011)
0:585
(0:006)
Sample selection controls
1 [um"m ; uf "m ]  0:187
(0:019)
 0:024
(0:004)
 0:152
(0:019)
 0:016
(0:004)
 0:155
(0:019)
 0:017
(0:004)
2 [um"f ; uf "f ]  0:061
(0:003)
 0:272
(0:016)
 0:057
(0:003)
 0:218
(0:017)
 0:049
(0:003)
 0:170
(0:016)
2um 0:490 0:482 0:461
2uf 0:618 0:600 0:557
um;uf 0:270 0:261 0:268
Other controls; constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R2 0.321 0.462 0.327 0.468 0.357 0.498
 Other variables included are: language, region of residence, citysize, mobility and
immigration dummies
Table A.3: Estimated earning functions by gender. Dependent variable log annual earnings in
1990. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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